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Abstract: 
 
This article aims to bypass polarized debates that either accuse migrants of abusing state forms of 
social protection or accuse states of excluding migrants from welfare provisions. It seeks to do so 
by analysing the intersection of formal and informal forms of social protection. By formal social 
protection, the article means social services provided by the state. ‘Informal social protection’ is 
used to refer to support mechanisms among family and social networks. Taking as a point of 
departure the housing strategies of migrant (care) workers and migrant families in Paris, the article 
is based on semi-directed, open-ended interviews with migrant (care) workers, migrant families, 
hotel managers and social workers, as well as on participant observations of migrant families during 
clandestine visits in so called welfare hotel. By exploring the operational dynamics of welfare 
hotels, the article illustrates how formal social protection schemes can isolate migrant women from 
their social networks. The article concludes by stressing the need to think about the social 
protection for migrant (care) workers in a way that allows both for informal and transnational 
protection mechanisms.  
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SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MIGRATION CONTROL:  
THE CASE OF MIGRANT CARE WORKERS AND PARISIAN WELFARE HOTELS 
 
As women in wealthier countries have been leaving their homes to take part in paid employment, 
migrants from poorer countries have left their own homes to work in those of these women. These 
migrant care workers, just as other migrants face the need to arrange for shelter in their new places 
of residence and work. At times these shelter arrangements are provided by the state – and in 
France more particularly in the form of room allocations in welfare hotels. The main clientele of 
welfare hotels are not tourists, but instead non-profit organisations, called social platforms, which 
provide publicly funded social services to homeless people.1 People in need of shelter can call the 
emergency hotline number ‘115’ to request emergency shelter in welfare hotels.  
Since the late 1980s, welfare hotels have been the standard way in which the Parisian public 
authorities have sheltered homeless people. By 80% publicly funded, the Samu Social is the biggest 
social platform providing shelter in welfare hotels. In Paris, the Samu Social provides on average 
shelter to 16,000 people every night (Samu Social de Paris 2011: 63) and spends over €8 million on 
hotel accommodation each month. Such public spending fuels debates about the need for restrictive 
immigration policies to defend the welfare state. 
Migrant women themselves also reflect on the public money that flows into shelter 
arrangements: “I know it’s not small money they pay for this place. But if you’re paying this kind 
of money, you can make sure the people inside are OK.” Gift is from Nigeria and has been living in 
welfare hotels since she arrived from Italy in November 2011.2 After a few initial moves between 
hotels, Gift had again had to move hotels on several occasions since giving birth to her second son. 
She considers that the French state is “wasting money” because people in emergency shelter 
arrangements, such as welfare hotels, are nonetheless “suffering and living like animals”. Residents 
living in welfare hotels frequently complain about having to move, time and time again, from one 
hotel to another. Gift also told me that she sometimes felt like she was living in a “prison”. 
Officially, as in most welfare hotels, she is not allowed to receive visitors or to use an electric stove 
to cook food in her room. As few welfare hotels have communal kitchens, families in welfare hotels 
are often left without any means to prepare food.  
Public debates are polarized between those that accuse states of excluding and not providing 
sufficient social protection for migrants and those that see migrants as a burden on the welfare state. 
The defence of the welfare state against fraud currently legitimates heightened migration control 
(Spire 2008: 52). Although French families can access accommodation, rather than mere shelter, 
																																								 																																								 							
1 The lack of specialized accommodation in Paris means that organizations supporting asylum seekers also regularly 
have to rely on welfare hotels 
2 All names have been replaced by pseudonyms. 
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based on social criteria, some argue that the French state’s provision of social protection to migrants 
is at the expense of nationals. At the same times as the Samu Social is publicly accused by the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance’s internal audit service of having mismanaged public money, 
other voices deplore that living conditions of people that do have access to welfare hotels. 
This article takes the housing strategies of migrant (care works) and migrant women in 
welfare hotels as a point of departure to analyse tensions between social protection and migration 
control. The article is based on the working assumption that we can only understand how migration 
and social protection intersect if we take seriously the perspective of migrants, as well as the ways 
in which their practices intersect with the regulatory regimes of markets, families and states. 
Consequently, the article does not presuppose that states are the prime and sole providers of shelter, 
but openly examines the place of states, families and market providers of shelter. The article asks 
two main questions: What types of shelter arrangements have (undocumented) migrant care 
workers themselves established so as to shelter themselves? How do state provided forms of shelter 
intersect with these arrangements and migrants’ social networks more broadly speaking? 
After a discussion of its research methodology, the article opens with an overview of 
scholarly debates on social protection, migration control and transnationalism. By illustrating how 
institutional priorities of formal social protection mechanisms discriminate against migrant women 
with children and partners, the first empirical section of the article suggests that welfare hotels feed 
into the production of mono-parental families. By illustrating how shelter in welfare hotels also 
constitutes a form of social and mobility control, the article suggests in the next section that welfare 
hotels make it more difficult for migrant families to rely on support from family circles and other 
social networks. In a third empirical section, the article traces care chains and social protection 
mechanisms beyond the borders of the French welfare state.  
 
Research methodology: welfare hotels and migrant care providers 
The article is based on ethnographic observations during visits with migrant families in seven 
welfare hotels, as well as on semi-directed, open-ended interviews with employees of various social 
platforms and twelve migrants from Cameroon working in the care sector. So as to generate multi-
layered and thick data, I used research with residents and hotel staff at two welfare hotels where I 
had sufficiently good entry points to combine the perspectives of inhabitants and managers. As 
visits to welfare hotels are highly regulated, my informants mostly suggested smuggling me into 
their rooms without formal prior authorisation by the respective hotel managers. The clandestine 
nature of my hotel visits is mostly a result of my choice to give priority to the study of the 
experiences of migrant women. I started my research with entry points and informal introductions 
to migrant women in welfare hotels, who would then in turn introduce me to their hotel managers. 
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Not being introduced to the migrant women by the hotel mangers enabled better rapport and trust 
and steered me somewhat more clear from being another layer of control for the women. As the 
women were used to transgressing hotel rules, risks for them were minimal. 
The article juxtaposes the experiences of West African migrant women (mostly 
Cameroonian and Nigerian) who had lived or were living in welfare hotels with the experiences of 
Cameroonian women and one Cameroonian man who had never lived in such hotels. Cameroonians 
constitute an increasingly significant, but also progressively more feminine immigrant community 
in France (Bouly de Lesdain 1999, Barou 2002: 12-13; Thierry 2001: 439).3 The interviews outside 
welfare hotels were conducted with migrant women providing paid or unpaid care, either as 
domestic workers, auxiliary nurses or family members. With regard to paid care work, 
Cameroonian migrant women in Paris mostly work in care for the elderly. The interviews focused 
on the experiences of such Cameroonian care providers as an example of other undocumented 
migrants from West African performing care work in the informal economy (Baron et al 2011: 100-
123). Although public policies in France have granted tax exemptions designed to promote formal 
employment in the care sector, care work in the informal economy has continued (Scrinzi 2009), 
with migrant women in welfare hotels often caring for the elderly or for children in return for 
payment. 
All the interviews were based on prior contacts and snowballing within migrant networks in 
Paris. I selected information rich cases and sought to capture a great variety of experiences, rather 
than a representative sample. While the legal situations of the migrants in this article varied, they 
had all been living in France without valid residence permits during substantial parts of their 
migration trajectories. The material of this article is only based on one study site, namely Paris. 
 
Social protection and migration control in a transnational world 
Movements across borders are a crucial mode for addressing livelihood insecurities (Sabates-
Wheeler and Waite 2003) and global inequalities (Faist 2013: 1640-1). As migration control creates 
obstacles for the transnational flow of people, a change in migration policies could potentially lead 
to more human development than development initiatives themselves are able to create (Bakewell 
2008: 1355). Migration policies however have remained restrictive despite both a surge in the faith 
in migration and development nexus (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012) and a demand for migrant workers in 
sectors, such as health, social care, hospitality, food production, construction and agriculture (Ruhs 
and Anderson 2010). The resulting illegality has a huge impact on social interactions and livelihood 
strategies of undocumented migrants (Sigona 2012, Bloch, Sigona and Wetter 2011) and by 
consequence the social protection of their family members in countries of origin. 
																																								 																																								 							
3 Between 1994 and 1999, the numbers of Cameroonians entering French territory more than doubled. 
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Scholars focusing on migration and social policy have identified whether and how migrants 
have been granted social rights by different legal, bureaucratic and political actors (Guiraudon 2000, 
Bommes and Geddes 2000; North, de Wenden and Taylor 1987, Sainsbury 2012). The body of 
literature on citizenship and on the confines of legitimate welfare recipients has tended, however, to 
overlook the important role played by migrant care workers (including those working as domestic 
workers or nurses and family migrants) in sustaining welfare policies (Ambrosini 2013). Although 
feminist literature on care workers abundantly illustrates migrants’ close involvement in providing 
care in their countries of residence (Lutz 2008, Marchetti and Venturini 2014, Shutes and Chiatti 
2012, van Hooren 2012, Williams 2009), such authors have until now paid somewhat less attention 
to the care needs of migrants upon retirement and their family members in countries of origin 
(Hochschild 2000, Parreñas 2005, Yeates 2009, van Walsum and Alpes 2014).  
Scholars focusing on human rights have paid attention to the basic needs of migrant (care) 
workers and argued for them to be included in the social protection systems of their countries of 
residence and work (Bosniak 2008, Carens 2008, Dembour 2011, Math and Toullier 2003-2004). 
Yet this body of literature neglects the fact that migrants can build safety mechanisms beyond 
government-sponsored insurance systems. Migrant workers’ salaries and the resulting remittances 
are an important source of transnationally provided social protection for families of migrants in 
countries of origin (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, Carling 2007, Boccagni 2011). Migrants can 
furthermore secure their future well-being by, for example, joining communal saving schemes or 
other informal insurance arrangements (Mazzucato 2009), by participating in transcontinental 
commerce (Ganga Bazenguissa 2000), by sending home second-hand cars (Beuving 2006) and by 
building homes in their villages of origin (Smith and Mazzucato 2009; Ndjio 2009). All of these 
activities constitute informal sources of social protection for migrants and their family networks.  
 It becomes possible to see cross-border activities of migrants as forms of social protection 
only if we overcome the methodological nationalism in the way we approach both people’s lifes 
and the role of the nation state in these trajectories (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Through 
their work on social network and multi-level relational analysis, scholars of transnationalism have 
opened up new insights into how migrants and their social networks interact across state borders 
(Basch et al 1994, Faist 2000, Glick Schiller et al 1992, Levitt 2001, Mahler 2000, Portes et al. 
1999, Mazzucato 2007). Despite some more recent calls to pay attention to “regimes of mobility” 
(Glick Schiller and Salazar 2012: 189) and changing institutions (Faist 2010), transnational studies 
have under-theorized legal regimes and state actors that delineate the possibilities for trans-border 
interactions in important ways (Meagher 2005). 
 The article’s attempt in trying to push ahead these debates is to add an analysis that 
considers both informal and formal sources of social protection in interaction with each other. 
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‘Social protection’ is understood in its broadest sense as meaning arrangements that provide cover 
for basic needs (such as health, housing and care), as well as protection against poverty and old age. 
By formal social protection, I mean social services provided by the state. In line with the global 
trend of privatizing the welfare state (Marwell 2004), these social services may be delivered 
through private market actors, while nevertheless being funded from the public purse. ‘Informal 
social protection’ is used to refer to support mechanisms among family and social networks. These 
informal support mechanisms may both rely on or avoid market actors. Market based forms of 
informal social protection could for example consists of investing into housing schemes in 
migrants’ countries of origin or private insurance schemes for repatriating dead bodies. Informal 
social protection avoiding market actors, such as money transfer companies, may consist of cross-
continental money circulation schemes based on trust among acquaintances. The nature of social 
networks is always necessarily ambivalent. Social networks can always function both as a source of 
social protection and a source of exploitation and vulnerability (Ives, Hanley, Walsh and Este 2014: 
159-161, Price and Spencer 2015: 17). This article examines both instances.  
Access to both formal and informal social protection can be facilitated by intermediaries, 
who find, create, block and propose alternative access points (Sabates-Wheeler and Macauslan 
2007). In the field of migration policies, McKeown has traced how states have created the norm of 
the ‘free migrant’ as an autonomous individual making personal choices free of pressures from 
social networks or other intermediaries (2008). The production of this norm renders intermediaries 
and migrants’ social ties dubious. Debates on welfare fraud and migrant families need to be seen 
against the background of states’ individualizing intentions.  
 
Informal shelter arrangements and access to welfare hotels 
While traditionally providing shelter to single male French nationals (Damon 2001), the 
Samu Social saw an increase of 500% in the numbers of families requesting shelter between 1999 
and 2009 (Le Méner and Oppenchaim 2012: 89). Almost all these families are migrant families.4 In 
2007, 75% of all migrant families in welfare hotels were from Africa (APUR 2007: 23). Contrary to 
other European countries, the provision of shelter through the free 115 hotline number of the Samu 
Social for homeless people in France is not conditional on their having a residence permit or an 
asylum request certificate. Regardless of their administrative status, parents with children under the 
age of eighteen are entitled to shelter (Le Méner and Oppenchaim 2012: 84 & 91). Consequently, 
most families in welfare hotels are single-parent families headed by women without a residence 
permit. 
																																								 																																								 							
4 In 2009, for example, fewer than 10% of families in temporary accommodation were French nationals (Guyavarch 
and Le Méner 2010: 19). 
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Although welfare hotels are overrun with requests for shelter, interviews with migrant care 
workers in Paris had not revealed welfare hotels as a key source of social protection. In what 
follows, the article draws on a series of life stories to illustrate how and why migrants shift between 
formal and informal forms of social protection. 
The first day my Guinean informant Fatouma brought me to her hotel, we were told at the 
reception desk that visits were not allowed before 2 p.m. I had not even been in the hotel for 
30 seconds before I was being told to leave. As it was only 11 a.m., Fatouma and I chose to wait in 
an annex of the hotel. Half of the annex contained three tables and a pile of chairs, while the other 
half was filled with about 40 prams. The welfare hotel residents call the annex the “pram lounge”, 
Fatouma sighed. The asylum support organization that had placed her in that hotel would soon be 
asking her to leave because her asylum request had been rejected. She told me that marriage and 
childbirth were the only two avenues left by which she could regularize her stay (Raissiguier 2010). 
Having been sexually abused by the military in her country of origin, she had no desire to go down 
either of those avenues. 
In a welfare hotel with 62 rooms and 200 inhabitants, Fatouma was one of only three single 
women without children. Some 46% of the families staying in Samu Social welfare hotels were 
single parents (Samu Social de Paris 2011: 74). Fatouma asked her asylum support organization to 
provide her with shelter when she started working in welfare hotels as part of the Masters 
programme that she was following. Before moving to a welfare hotel, she had rented a small room 
from a fellow Guinean woman she had met by chance in an African neighbourhood of Paris. 
Families play an important role in sheltering newly arrived migrants, at least temporarily. 
Many of the migrant women interviewed in this study had been able to borrow official documents 
from family members; these immediately allowed them to perform paid care work. While solidarity 
can function as an informal source of social protection, social ties and family networks are not 
necessarily based on trust and can be disappointing and exploitative (Meagher 2005). This is 
because, in return for providing shelter, family members may expect newly arrived migrants to 
provide child care for them without pay.  
The 50-year-old Cameroonian Reine, for example, had had to look after the children of her 
niece Josianne in France for two years without pay. During this period, Reine was housed and fed, 
while she sometimes also received €50 or a metro ticket. Josianne once also paid half of the tuition 
fees for Reine’s son, who was at medical school in Cameroon. Josianne was happy to have her 
children looked after and provided no support or information to Reine on how she could improve 
her situation. When the daughter of a friend from Cameroon suggested that Reine should register 
for the basic medical insurance that the state provides to anyone who has been in France for longer 
than three months (i.e. aide médicale de l’état), Josianne became angry with Reine and a conflict 
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broke out. Apart from basic emergency healthcare, the aide médicale de l’état is also a very useful 
way for undocumented migrants to prove their presence on French territory. A few months after 
registering for health insurance, Reine was forced to leave her niece’s home. Fortunately, however, 
the same Cameroonian friend helped Reine to find paid care work and to move to a small room of 
her own. 
 The provision of unpaid care by undocumented migrants is one of the ways in which 
pressure on the French welfare state can be reduced. Paulina’s case illustrates how undocumented 
migrants play a crucial role in providing unpaid care to family members with residence permits and 
even to those with French nationality. Paulina came to France with the help of a migration broker 
paid for by her elder sister, Agatha. Paulina’s son had French nationality, but had to stay in 
Cameroon with his father, who did not want him to leave. Paulina started caring for elderly people 
by using the residence and work permit of her elder sister, who was ill and had no children of her 
own to take care of. Together, Paulina and Agatha provided shelter and unpaid care for their niece, 
Agnès. The latter had French nationality and came to France at the age of thirteen with the help of 
her father, who later mistreated her. Despite her entitlement, as a French national, to specialized 
residential care, Agnès moved into the apartment of her two aunts.  
When Paulina’s son was finally allowed by his father to come to France, Paulina was de 
facto caring for two French nationals, despite not having a residence or work permit herself. When 
Agatha died, Paulina had to leave the home where she had been staying with her son and her niece 
because the rental contract had been in Agatha’s name. Through the friend of a cousin, they found 
an apartment that they could sub-rent informally. Despite the loss of the cover that had been 
provided by her sister’s documents, Paulina was able to continue working for her employers. 
Although Paulina’s migration trajectory was not sanctioned by the state authorities in the form of a 
residence permit, her move to France allowed her not only to send remittances to family members 
in Cameroon, but also to care for her elder sister until the latter’s death, as well as for two children 
of French nationality. 
Whether migrants can stay with family members upon arrival in France depends on the 
strength and closeness of their ties (Timéra 2000). Migrants’ housing arrangements both express 
and alter family norms and formations. Marriage and childbirth, in particular, are crucial events in 
terms of changing needs and opportunities. After spending five weeks with her cousin, the 30-year-
old Cameroonian migrant woman Myriam was told to leave the apartment by her cousin’s French 
husband. Unable to provide direct shelter, her cousin paid for a hotel room where Myriam could 
stay for two weeks. After then paying for a hotel for a few months at her own expense, Myriam 
started a relationship with a French man whom she later married. By the time they divorced, 
Myriam was sufficiently well settled to find rooms she could sub-rent informally through 
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acquaintances. Although Myriam’s informal rent was higher than the official rent paid to the 
landlord, she preferred not to go to a welfare hotel. When a pregnant cousin of Myriam was thrown 
out of her marital home by her French husband, Myriam agreed to let her stay in her informally 
rented room. Myriam told me that the Samu Social welfare hotels are too hard to bear because you 
have to move to a different shelter every other night. She did not want her pregnant cousin to have 
to do that. However, although Myriam was able to provide accommodation for her cousin during 
her pregnancy, her home was too small also to accommodate a child. After her cousin had given 
birth, Myriam therefore asked her to contact the Samu Social, which then housed her in a series of 
different welfare hotels over the next two years. 
The above cases illustrate that welfare hotels are often a last resort for migrants seeking 
shelter.5 Migrant women often experience a series of more or less problematic shelter arrangements 
before circumstances push them to rely on welfare hotels. Samantha, for example, came to 
Germany as an au pair. In return for providing care, she was supposed to receive shelter, food and a 
monthly allowance of €250. Although she received her monthly allowance on an irregular basis, she 
did not complain as the employer in whose house she was living had confiscated her passport and 
birth certificate. Samantha was ultimately able to leave this employer with the help of someone in 
France who agreed to certify that she would employ her as an au pair. When Samantha arrived in 
Paris, she first stayed with this person and later with a friend of her father-in-law. The latter claimed 
to be her uncle when he introduced her to the other people with whom he was sub-renting an 
apartment. After this man sexually assaulted Samantha, she sought refuge in the room of another 
woman in the same apartment. This woman helped her to find a job in a beauty parlour where she 
could also sleep at night. Through a customer of the beauty parlour, Samantha eventually found a 
room to sub-rent. She earned €550 a month, of which she paid €250 to the ‘aunt’ she had met at the 
parlour. When Samantha later found a French boyfriend, she moved in with him, but did not tell 
him that she did not have a residence permit. That relationship fell apart after Samantha had become 
pregnant by this man. A customer at a restaurant where she was working told her that the Samu 
Social “takes pregnant women without papers”.  
Although the Samu Social’s 115 hotline is officially supposed to be unconditionally 
available for anyone with a child under eighteen (DGCS 2010), the reality is somewhat different. 
Instead of using strict waiting lists or queues to manage their insufficient resources, staff at the call 
centre struggle to allocate rooms by giving priority to both the most vulnerable and to those 
considered the least excluded and thus the most likely to be able to reintegrate. (Le Méner 2011). 
As access to welfare hotels is partly conditional on being particularly vulnerable, it is better for 
women with children to call the 115 telephone service as single women and not as part of a couple. 
																																								 																																								 							
5 For parallels in the U.K., see Price and Spencer 2015: 57. 
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Once most of the places have been allocated during the morning rush hour, hotline staff have to 
negotiate with the coordinator to see who will get the few remaining places before new rooms 
become available again at 7 p.m. 
Bureaucratic definitions of who has priority in accessing welfare hotels substantially alter 
migrants’ family formations and social ties. The father of a child living in a welfare hotel is only 
allowed to visit if he is officially registered as a resident in a welfare hotel. In welfare hotels, 
however, single women have priority over women with partners. Under certain circumstances, men 
can access accommodation schemes for migrant workers, called foyers. Foyers function in a 
similarly isolating manner and only accept only single men without families (Sayad 1980). As a 
result, a father can find himself living in a foyer in one part of town, while the mother of his child is 
living in a welfare hotel in another part of town. Formal forms of social protection can at times 
isolate migrants from their social networks. In what follows, the article analyses internal 
contradictions in formal forms of social protection and their impact on migrants and their families. 
 
Policy contradictions and repercussions for informal social protection 
Although migrant families sometimes live for up to three or four years in welfare hotels, they 
frequently have to move from hotel to hotel. Some migrant families have to move hotel three or 
four times a year, while others may even move every other week. What is the reason for these 
moves? And what are the repercussions for the social ties of migrant families accommodated in 
such hotels? 
Tensions between migration control and social policies play a crucial role in determining the 
actual well-being of migrant families (Price and Spencer 2015). On the one hand, any homeless 
person – regardless of their legal status – has a legal right to accommodation in France. On the other 
hand, migration policy is geared towards expelling people who do not have residence permits. The 
contradictions between migration policy and social policy have resulted in perverse situations, 
which have an adverse effect both on the living conditions of migrant families and on public 
spending. Welfare hotels are a very costly way of providing shelter. Depending on whether hotel 
managers charge per night or per month, and on whether they charge per person or per room, shelter 
in a welfare hotel costs between €700 and €2,000 a month, and sometimes even as much as €3,000.  
Although actors in the field of social policy are trying to move away from hotels and to 
more stable housing solutions,  such moves are difficult in a context where even a centre-left 
government cannot be seen to be giving housing to undocumented migrant families. Cheaper 
solutions would require public authorities to acknowledge the enduring nature of irregular 
migration. While more expensive than other forms of shelter, one advantage of hotel rooms is that 
their inhabitants do not acquire formal rights to residency or social housing. By providing shelter in 
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welfare hotels, the state is able to maintain the illusion that it is reacting only in response to an 
emergency. This illusion comes at a cost, however, that is both financial and human.  
Social actors involved with homeless people, as well as with migrant populations, are very 
concerned by the negative repercussions that regularly having to move from hotel to hotel has on 
migrants’ access to formal social protection. The biggest concern among advocates of migrants’ 
social rights relates to their access to schooling and healthcare facilities (Le Méner and Oppenchaim 
2012: 99). Ironically, access to these formal types of social protection can indirectly also feed into 
migrant families’ enforced mobility between welfare hotels, and thus further enforce their 
vulnerability. The tensions are particularly crystallized by the issue of access to education for 
children living in welfare hotels, and this often brings social platforms into conflict with local 
authorities.6 
Social platforms such as the Samu Social often have branches in various cities and districts. 
The Samu Social of Paris receives the highest number of shelter requests and is unable to place all 
migrant families within its own constituency. Local authorities in cities outside Paris that are 
requested to place migrant families complain that they are not financially compensated by the 
municipality of Paris for having to provide education facilities for higher numbers of children. 
Transforming a tourist hotel into a welfare hotel may mean that a municipality or other local 
authority also has to set up new classes in order to accommodate children from welfare hotels.  
As a result of their reluctance to incur such additional public spending, local authorities have 
become increasingly active in inspecting safety standards and fire regulations. If a hotel is found to 
have breached any of the multiple sets of regulations, it can be closed down by the city council for 
months and sometimes even years. And that, in turn, results in migrant families having to move to 
yet another different hotel, often in a different district.  
At other times, tensions between social and migration policies are resolved less elegantly. A 
social policy actor within a national federation for the homeless told me that migrant families in 
welfare hotels were sometimes directly instructed by social platforms not to apply for any social 
services within the hotel’s local community. Local authorities have been known to complain to 
social platforms when migrant families breach these instructions, and this in turn can result in the 
migrant families being expelled from their hotels.  
Migrant families can also find themselves expelled directly by hotel managers for ‘bad 
behaviour’. The likelihood of such an expulsion depends entirely on the disposition of the hotel 
managers. One hotel manager I talked to owns eight hotels and, on average, expels one family a 
week. Another hotel receptionist I talked to had only expelled one family over a total of nine 
																																								 																																								 							
6 For tensions in the U.K. between accommodation in Bed and Breakfast facilities and the welfare of children, see Price 
and Spencer 2015. 
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months. The reasons for expulsions can range from the consumption of drugs to repeated breaking 
of hotel rules, such as washing your laundry in the hotel bathroom.  
Shelter arrangements in welfare hotels also function as a form of social control (Aumercier 
2004). Historically, issues of public order, and in particular public health, have been at the origins 
of state intervention in the domain of shelter arrangements for migrants (Lévy-Vroelant 2004: 151). 
The 115 reservations platform, for example, has a file for each user; these files contain data on the 
individual’s situation, including details of forthcoming medical appointments. Welfare hotel 
residents are expected to call 115 regularly. Sometimes, the 115 platform may notify hotel 
managers that certain families are no longer eligible for shelter. These notifications also serve to 
discipline migrant families into calling and providing updates on their current situation. The 
Cameroonian migrant woman Samantha regarded the Samu Social as “part of the police”. 
The control that is exerted on the social behaviour and mobility on migrant women in 
welfare hotels also indirectly hinders them from accessing more informal sources of social 
protection. Regular moves from hotel to hotel, as well as strict visitor regulations, restrict the 
capacity of migrant women in welfare hotels to form new or maintain pre-existing social networks. 
Migrant women in welfare hotels can find themselves constrained in their ability, for example, to 
engage in courtship.7 Foyers and welfare hotels rarely allow visits during the day and totally forbid 
overnight visits, while residents are de facto obliged to return to their hotel each night. Residents 
who do not use their hotel room for a night are officially supposed to reimburse the Samu Social for 
the costs of that night in the hotel.  
Rules at welfare hotels are multi-layered and largely interpreted by the hotel mangers 
themselves. When I first meet Gift, the Nigerian woman whose quote opens the article, she was 
accompanied by her two children aged five and one and her Nigerian friend Stella. As we 
approached the Algerian restaurant belonging to the hotel, Gift asked me whether the hotel manager 
knew I was coming. In principle, she was not allowed to receive me in her room. For the past ten 
days, however, she had allowed Stella to stay in her room. Stella was one of three Nigerian women 
that I met who had all worked in Italy before coming to France during the final months of their 
pregnancy. As Gift was used to evading hotel rules, she did not hesitate for long and indicated I 
should go up the staircase. Throughout the day, I was afraid of being caught as an illegal visitor and 
did not leave the room much.  
The hotel was relatively dirty, sparsely furnished and clearly a transient place. Gift’s room 
was about 9m2 and contained a microwave, a kettle, a fridge, a cupboard, a bed for three people and 
a small table. Toilets and shower facilities on each of the two floors were shared. The hallway was 
‘decorated’ with fire extinguishers, security regulations and letters to the inhabitants detailing the 
																																								 																																								 							
7 For a broader picture on connections between homelessness and sexuality, see also Oppenchaim et al 2010. 
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hotel rules. Gift would have liked a bigger room, but did not want to change hotels because this one 
– unusually – had a communal, albeit small, kitchen. She and her new-born baby’s father, a French 
national of Togolese origin, were no longer a couple, but still at times in contact with each other.  
While migrant women in welfare hotels are subject to a great deal of control, these hotels 
can also end up functioning as a resource for informal types of social protection. Thanks to her 
welfare hotel, Gift had become a broker for shelter arrangements. Her formal housing arrangements 
allowed her to provide informal support to Stella, whom she knew from her time in Italy. Stella had 
previously called 115, but was still waiting to be allocated a hotel. During her stay at Gift’s place, 
Stella helped to take care of Gift’s baby when Gift took her elder son to school.  
As we left the hotel after a long day of cooking, discussing and eating, Gift bumped into the 
hotel receptionist on the street. She told him that she was going to have her hair done later that day. 
As we walked off, she explained to me that she was “preparing his mind” for the idea that she 
would be having a visitor in her room that night. Gift was taking a risk for herself and her children 
in providing shelter to another person in her room and thus breaking hotel regulations.  
Visits to welfare hotels are highly regulated because of fire regulations, but also because 
hotel owners are de facto assumed to be responsible for any sex work occurring within their 
establishments. In hotels that only partly cater for ‘social clients’, migrant women can at times offer 
sexual services to other clients at the hotel. While visits to welfare hotels are highly regulated, the 
exact contours of what is or is not allowed are left almost exclusively to the discretion of the hotel 
staff. When I spoke to the same hotel receptionist a few weeks later, he told me that residents in his 
hotel were entitled to receive visitors. I was astonished. He then added that although residents in the 
hotel had the right to receive visitors, whether that right was allowed to be exercised depended on 
him: “They have the right…. It depends on me”. 
Upon close examination, evidence of the anti-migration climate in France is tangibly felt in 
the form of conflicts between actors in charge of welfare hotels, as well as in the social organization 
of the welfare hotels themselves. Implicit in the regular moves between welfare hotels is also the 
idea that these reduce migrant women’s dependence on shelter in welfare hotels. Many of the 
control mechanisms at play in these shelter arrangements are not necessarily specific to migrants. In 
many ways, migration control is all about control of the global poor (Anderson 2013), with the 
notion of ‘emergency’, for example, also dominating shelter arrangements for homeless French 
nationals (Brunetaux 2007).  
 
The need for transnational forms of social protection  
At a time when social rights for citizens are becoming increasingly fragmented, Faist has called for 
a study of how these rights intersect with what he refers to as the transnational social question 
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(2009: 29). Citizens and migrants share more experiences of economic marginalisation than public 
debate allows us to immediately grasp (Anderson 2013). When thinking about ways of regulating 
migration and social protection, it is thus important to think outside the territorial box of the nation 
state. As people “forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies 
of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton-Blanc, 1994: 7), their needs for social 
protection evolve, too. The below case of Samantha illustrates how citizens and migrants are bound 
to one another for care arrangements and access to social protection. 
Just like many other migrant (care) workers, Samantha has made important contributions to 
the social protection of families in Europe by performing both paid and unpaid care work for 
French nationals. Samantha left the insecurity of life in Cameroon at the age of 21 to work as an au 
pair in Germany. She later moved to France and started working as a care worker – babysitting and 
collecting children from school – while still living in a welfare hotel. These days, she is in social 
housing and undergoing training to become a kindergarten assistant. Although she occasionally 
babysits for her former employers, her work is not officially declared.  
Samantha’s life trajectory also shows how migration can turn individuals into sources of 
social protection for family members back home. Samantha’s younger brother and sister in 
Cameroon benefited, for example, from the money she sent them for their studies. Samantha’s next 
aim is to set up a small business for her mother so that she would not have to send as much money 
to Cameroon. She also wants to reduce her care responsibilities so that she could start thinking 
about her own situation, including the question of a possible return to Cameroon upon her 
retirement.  
Samantha’s case illustrates how social protection does not stop at national borders, neither 
for her family in Cameroon, nor for the French families for whom she provided child care. If family 
ties increasingly extend across borders, so, too, will social protection mechanisms need to be 
thought of in a transnational framework. Other examples of migrants’ care arrangements and social 
protection mechanisms in this study further underline the need to think of social protection in a 
transnational manner. 
While the daily struggle for their own and their family’s development did not allow all 
migrant (care) workers of this study to foresee how they would care for themselves at times of old 
age, some had explicit plans for retirement. Aware of not being able to sustain their physically 
challenging work indefinitely, they expressed the need to open up businesses in Cameroon to 
complement their pension entitlements (which after years of informal work are usually too low for 
survival in France), their need for free travel back to France to be able to access both pension 
payments and medical care, as well their need for independent and appropriate housing during old 
age. While occasionally already tied into housing schemes in their country of residence, many 
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migrant (care) workers in this study intended to invest their savings into apartments and houses in 
their country of origin.  
Housing investments can be a crucial source of social protection upon retirement. In seeking 
to carry out these investments in their countries of origin, migrant (care) workers face fears of being 
duped by their family, high costs for money transfers and the challenge of being physically too far 
removed to oversee construction works on a daily basis. Investments into housing schemes and 
businesses in countries of origin both require migrants to be able to wire money in between 
countries and continents. While tax reductions for formally sent remittances can enable migrants 
own initiatives, informal money sending schemes remain popular because of punitive fees of 
transfer companies. In the wake of counter-terrorism schemes, informal money transfer 
arrangements have increasingly become the subject of regulation and control. State regulation of 
financial flows can constitute a hurdle for migrants’ investment projects for their retirement. 
The example of housing investments for retirement illustrates how transnational social 
protection can at times be facilitated simply by doing away with structural constraints that block 
flows of people and things between countries and continents. Factoring mobility into our thinking 
on social protection allows us to see beyond the nation state as the only and exclusive source of 
social protection. In the Philippines, India and Bangladesh, for example, migrant associations have 
set up transnational and informal social protection schemes for migrants (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Waite 2003: 61). 
 
Conclusion 
The Nigerian woman quoted at the start of the article highlighted a paradox: Why does the 
French state commit large amounts of money to providing a system of shelter in which people are 
subjected to constant relocations and where they are unable to receive visitors or cook? One of the 
reasons for this social policy field’s failure to provide satisfactory shelter arrangements at a 
reasonable cost to the public purse relates to the lack of political will to acknowledge the presence 
of migrant families in France as anything but a temporary phenomenon. Public debates on migrants’ 
abuse of European welfare states see migrants as individuals who have come to Europe to create 
families, rather than as individuals with family members in their countries of nationality and who 
come to support families in Europe by caring for children and the elderly. 
If welfare hotels do not result in the provision of satisfactory shelter arrangements, the 
question arises as to what they produce in the form of corollary policy outcomes? As Ferguson 
argues, we need to take policy failures seriously, not because of what they fail to deliver, but 
instead because of the effects of their failure (Ferguson 1990). Welfare hotels provide shelter 
primarily to single-parent families headed by women. By illustrating how institutional priorities 
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discriminate against migrant mothers with partners, the article suggests that welfare hotels feed into 
the production of mono-parental families. By illustrating how shelter in welfare hotels also 
constitutes a form of social and mobility control, the article furthermore suggests that welfare hotels  
make it more difficult for migrant families to rely on support from their family circles and other 
social networks. Thus welfare hotels’ disciplinary logics are in line with the individualizing effects 
of migration control; the latter promotes the myth of autonomous individuals, while criminalizing 
forms of non-state mediation.  
In his book The Price of Rights, Ruhs claims that a liberalization of labour immigration 
policies in high-income countries is incompatible with equal rights for migrant workers. 
Interestingly, parallel studies on shelter arrangements for migrants in the Netherlands and the U.K. 
already illustrate the emergence of a parallel welfare system (Price and Spencer 2015, Leekers 
forthcoming). Based on an understanding of well-being and development that goes beyond access 
to formal rights, Ruhs furthermore argues that “it is not surprising to see migrant workers making 
‘sacrifices’ in some dimensions of development (e.g. limited access to some legal rights) in 
exchange for advancing others (e.g. opportunities to access employment at higher wages and raise 
the household incomes of their families).”8 The findings of this article suggest that formal access 
rights to social protection can also come at a social cost to migrants and their family networks. The 
sacrifices of migrants to be able to access employment in high-income countries could be reduced 
by taking a more enabling approach towards migrants’ own initiatives – many of which are based 
on existing social networks and thus fundamentally transnational in nature. 
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